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Pratt: Will Regulations Prevent Litigation?

WILL REGULATIONS PREVENT LITIGATION? AN ANALYSIS OF
THE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENTS 2017 REVENUE
PROPOSALS CONCERNING CONSERVATION EASEMENT
DEDUCTIONS
Garrett Pratt*

I. INTRODUCTION
The two following factual scenarios depict two types of property
whose landowners have claimed a Conservation Easement Deduction for
placing a conservation easement on them under Section 170(h) of the
Internal Revenue Code (“Section 170(h)”).
Charles and Susan Glass (“the couple”) owned ten acres of land
featuring “a high undeveloped bluff on 460 feet of shoreline [off of Lake
Michigan]”1 that included threatened vegetation and a spot commonly
frequented by bald eagles.2 The couple donated the 460 feet of shoreline to
a “qualified organization” under Section 170(h) and claimed a $100,000
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2017. Managing Editor, Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, 20162017. Special thanks to R. Brett Smith and K. Alex Langley for their substantive review
and thoughtful feedback on this Article.
1
Glass v. C.I.R., 124 T.C. 258 (2005), aff'd, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006).
2
Id.
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deduction for the conservation easement they contributed.3 The Internal
Revenue Service (“the Service”) audited the couple because it claimed
they did not meet Section 170(h)’s “exclusively for conservation
purposes” requirement.4 However, the tax court held that the couple did
meet the requirement and qualified for a Section 170(h) deduction because
the couple had “gratuitously surrendered valuable property rights . . .
which preserve this Nation’s natural resources . . . consistent with the
statute’s [policy] objective.”5
In contrast, consider Kiva Dunes Golf Course (“Kiva Dunes”),
located 12 miles south of Gulf Shores, Alabama, on the Fort Morgan
Peninsula.6 E.A. Drummond, the golf course’s developer, purchased
nearly 500 acres of beachfront land for $1 million in 1992 to create the
golf

course.7

While

developing

Kiva

Dunes,

Drummond

also

contemporaneously constructed a gated, residential resort community
surrounding Kiva Dunes, including swimming pools, tennis courts, and

3

Id.
Id. at 259.
5
Id. at 283-84.
6
Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. C.I.R., 97 T.C.M. 1 (CCH) 1818 (T.C. 2009).
7
Id.
4
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beach access.8 After opening in 1995, Kiva Dunes has been considered a
top-rated golf course.9
In 2002, Drummond put a “perpetual conservation easement” on
Kiva Dunes and transferred ownership of Kiva Dunes and its easement to
a non-profit organization.10 The easement generally prohibited the
development of the land for any purpose other than for a statutorilyrecognized conservation purpose, which includes use as a golf course.11
Drummond claimed a $30.5 million deduction for a charitable contribution
for the easement under Section 170(h).12 The Service, in 2005, audited
Drummond and argued that Kiva Dune’s easement was an improper
Conservation Easement Deduction because the easement’s valuation was
heavily inflated.13 During the Service’s audit of Drummond, the Service’s
commissioner, Steven Miller, testified to the United States Senate Finance
Committee that “more than 340 [Section 170(h)] easement donors were

8

Id.
Id. at n. 4.
10
Id. at 1.
11
Id. at n. 5. Additionally, the non-profit organization to which Drummond transferred
Kiva Dunes concurrently agreed to lease Kiva Dunes to Drummond. Id.
12
Id. at 1.
13
Ryan Dezember, Famed Coastal Alabama golf Course Kiva Dunes wins $28.7 Million
tax Credit, AL.COM (Jul. 19, 2009, 9:59 AM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2009/07/famed_coastal_alabama_golf_cou.html.
9
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either under audit or would be soon.”14 Despite the Service’s efforts, after
three years of auditing and litigation, the Service conceded that Kiva
Dunes qualified for the Section 170(h) deduction.15 The tax court
eventually reduced Drummond’s deduction by only $2 million, and
Drummond successfully avoided paying any tax penalties.16
II. THE CURRENT CLIMATE: THE SERVICE’S CRACK DOWN ON
TAXPAYER ABUSE OF THE CONSERCATION EASEMENT DEDUCTION
IS A SYMPTOM OF A LACK OF TREASURY REGULATION
Since Kiva Dunes, the Service has been cracking down on taxpayer
abuse of the Section 170(h)’s Conservation Easement Deduction. 17 As the
contrast between Glass and Kiva Dunes illustrates, the Service is doing so
for two reasons.
Chiefly, the Service is curbing abuse on the lucrative tax savings
the deduction creates. An individual who makes a “qualified conservationcontribution”18 of real property may deduct up to 50% of his or her
adjusted gross income in the year of disposition of the land; a corporation

14

Id.
Richard Rubin, IRS Tees Off on Golf Courses’ Green Tax Claims, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, (Jan. 4, 2016, 8:56 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/irs-tees-off-on-golfcourses-green-tax-claims-1451959008.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See generally I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015), Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (2009).
15
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that makes a qualifying contribution generally may deduct up to 10 % of
its taxable income.19 Even more enticing, when the donated land’s value is
greater than the taxpayer’s income in the year of disposition, the
remaining deduction amount can also be applied to offset taxable income
for 15 years following the donation of the conservation easement. 20 While
this tax deduction has been used for commendable purposes,21 there is
mounting concern the Conservation Easement Deduction is abused by a
small number of wealthy individuals who are avoiding tax liability by
overestimating the value of their deductions and claiming deductions on
ineligible land; the most notorious of which claim Conservation Easement
Deductions for golf courses.22 In 2012, the most recent year for which data
is available, 1,114 taxpayers on average claimed $872,250 in Conservation
Easement Deductions; that combined equals almost $1 billion in untaxed

19

I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015), Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (2009); see also DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017
REVENUE PROPOSALS 213-17 (2017) (herein “2017 Treasury Proposal”),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2017.pdf.
20
See generally I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015).
21
Rubin, supra note 15; see also Glass v. C.I.R., 124 T.C. 258, 258 (2005), aff'd, 471
F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006).
22
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19
FLA. TAX REV. 225, 228 (2016).
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income.23 Some scholars estimate that the U.S. federal government has
forgone over $100 million in tax revenue as a result.24
The Service is presently litigating approximately two dozen cases
across the United States contesting the validity of taxpayers’ Conservation
Easement Deduction claims “where there does not appear to be a
conservation purpose served [in claims involving golf courses],” as
Former-Commissioner

Miller

testified

to

the

Senate

Finance

Committee. 25 Notably, President Donald Trump also claimed the
Conservation Easement Deduction for several golf courses in 1995, 2005,
2014, and 2015, for combined deductions in excess of tens of millions of
dollars.26
The second reason the Service is currently litigating so many cases
is that litigation has been the only way the Service has been able to
constrict taxpayer abuse. What makes the Service’s current crackdown
against taxpayers significant is that it epitomizes the Conservation

23

Rubin, supra note 15.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE “PROTECTING
AMERICANS FROM TAX HIKES” ACT OF 2015, JCX-143-15 (2015).
25
Id.; Dezember, supra note 13.
26
Richard Rubin, Donald Trump’s Tax Numbers Sharpen Focus on Treatment of Losses,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trumpstax-numbers-tighten-focus-on-treatment-of-losses-1475415294.
24
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Easement

Deductions’

heavily-litigated

forty-year

history.27

The

Conservation Easement Deduction has been the source of a significant
amount of litigation because the regulations defining Section 170(h)’s key
statutory terms of art are overly broad and do not create a clear framework
for evaluating the accuracy of Conservation Easement Deduction
valuations. While some scholars say the Service’s best present hope for
reducing abuse is winning cases against taxpayers abusing the
Conservation Easement Deduction,28 which would create binding
authority, litigation is only a short-term solution.
In response to this growing problem, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury (“the Treasury”) has outlined in its “General Explanations of the
Administration’s

Fiscal

Year

2017

Revenue

Proposals”

several

recommendations that would lead to new regulations curbing taxpayer
abuse of the Conservation Easement Deduction.29 The proposals would
add new requirements and penalties to Section 170(h) and suggest creating
an alternative conservation easement tax credit that could eventually
27

See generally Jessica Jay & Melissa K. Thompson, An Examination of Court Opinions
on the Enforcement And Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation
and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches To Date, CONSERVATION TAX CENTER.
28
Rubin, supra note 15.
29
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224-29.
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replace the Section 170(h) deduction.30 The Treasury has proposed for
several years promulgating new regulations to constrict Section 170(h)’s
breadth and, in its most recent proposals, has made some general
indications on how it would curb abuse.31
This article examines the Treasury’s 2017 proposals refining
Section 170(h). This article assesses the likely effects of the Treasury’s
proposals by discussing their impact in four key ways: (1) the new
requirements

placed

on

“qualified

organizations”

who

receive

conservation easement contributions; (2) donors’ increased substantiation
requirements; (3) the exclusion of golf courses from Section 170(h)
eligibility; and (4) the pilot conservation easement tax credit program. For
each of these, this article will: examine the category’s current Section
30

Id.
Id.; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS 188-94 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-ExplanationsFY2016.pdf (herein “2016 Treasury Proposal”); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2015 REVENUE PROPOSALS 193
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/GeneralExplanations-FY2015.pdf (herein “2015 Treasury Proposal”); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 161 (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2014.pdf (herein “2014 Treasury Proposal”);
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 140 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf (herein “2013 Treasury
Proposal”).
31
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170(h) regulatory treatment, if any, outline what the new proposals
require, and then walk through the likely effects of these proposals. This
article argues that the most efficient regulatory approach available to the
Treasury is to ban golf courses from Section 170(h) eligibility and leave
all other current regulatory requirements on “qualified organizations” and
donors the same to continue to encourage conservation easement
donations.
III. SEVEN SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SECTION 170(H)’S HISTORY
The Conservation Easement Deduction is codified in Internal
Revenue Code (“the Code”) Section 170(h)(1). It states that “a ‘qualified
conservation contribution’ [is] – (A) of a qualified real property interest,
(B) to a qualified organization, (C) [made] exclusively for conservation
purposes.”32 The statute’s current form has changed significantly over
time. While there is no comprehensive history on Section 170(h),33 there
are seven events that are significant to its history.

32

I.R.C. § 170(h)(1) (2015).
McLaughlin, supra note 22. However, McLaughlin is the pre-eminent scholar on the
Conservation Easement Deduction and her forthcoming publication is an exhaustive
history of the Conservation Easement deduction as well as a thorough analysis of
contemporary cases. Id. “To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the case
law involving alleged overvaluation of conservation and façade easements for § 170(h)
deduction purposes. This article fills that void.” Id. at 230.
33
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The Service first authorized a conservation easement contribution
to be a charitable income tax deduction in 1964 in Revenue Ruling 6420534 when the Service held “[a] gratuitous conveyance to the United
States of America of a restrictive easement in real property . . . to preserve
the scenic view of certain public properties, is a charitable contribution
within the meaning of Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.”35
Second, in the 1980s, following the enactment of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976, “land trusts and public agencies began to use conservation
easements routinely for protecting conservation lands.”36 This is
significant because modernly land trusts and conservation public agencies
are the recipients of Conservation Easement Deductions.37 Third, the Tax
Reform Act became a part of the Code in the Tax Treatment Act of 1980

34

Internal Revenue Serv., Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS.GOV (July
6, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer. A revenue
ruling is an official interpretation by the IRS of the Internal Revenue Code, related
statutes, tax treaties and regulations. It is the conclusion of the IRS on how the law is
applied to a specific set of facts. Revenue rulings are published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin for the information of and guidance to taxpayers, IRS personnel, and tax
professionals. Id.
35
Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
36
ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK 7 (Laurie Risino & Jessica Jay, eds., 1st ed. 2015).
37
Nancy McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation Easement
Donations - A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 1 (2004).
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(“the 1980 Act”), which significantly altered the 1976 legislation. 38 To
take the Conservation Easement Deduction, the 1980 Act required that a
taxpayer prove the conservation easement will last for no less than 30
years and be made exclusively for conservation purposes to a qualifying
organization.39 It also defined “conservation purposes” to mean: (1) the
preservation of land areas for public outdoor recreation, education, or
scenic enjoyment; (2) the preservation of historically important land areas
or structures; or (3) the protection of natural environmental systems. 40 The
above conservation purposes are the same as those listed in Section
170(h)’s current codification. It is notable that Daniel Halperin, the
Treasury’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, fortuitously
expressed concern as to “whether procedures exist[ed] to insure that [a
conservation easement] will continue to be used for conservation purposes
and for the benefit of the general public.”41

38

Nancy A. McLaughlin, Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity
Standards for Federally Subsidized Conservation Easements (pt. 1), 45 REAL PROP. TR.
& EST. L. J. 473, 478 (2010).
39
Id. at 476.
40
Id.
41
Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 3-4 (1979) (statement of Hon. Daniel I.
Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury).
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Fourth, Congress passed moderate reforms to Section 170(h) in
2006 outlining new circumstances in which penalties for deduction abuse
were warranted and increasing the amount of substantiation required for
an appraisal to meet all “qualified appraisal’s” requirements.42 Overall,
however, Section 170(h)’s reform helped taxpayers take advantage of the
Conservation Easement Deduction rather than curtail abuse.43
Fifth, Senators Max Baucus (Democrat-Montana) and Orrin Hatch
(Republican-Virginia) sponsored and authored the Rural Heritage
Conservation Extension Act of 2013 which would have amended the Code
to do two things.44 First, it would have made Conservation Easement
Deduction levels permanent. Second, it would have banned the use of
Conservation Easement Deductions for a contribution for “contributions of
an easement for use on, or intended use on, a golf course.” 45 The language
of the Senate bill tracks verbatim the language used by the Treasury in its
Green Book proposal in fiscal year 2013.46

42

McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 229, n. 10; see also Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780,
§§ 1213, 1219 (2006).
43
McLaughlin, supra note 22 at 229, n. 10.
44
Rural Heritage Conservation Extension Act, S. 526, 113th Cong. (2013).
45
Id.
46
Compare to 2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31.
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Sixth, Representative Jim Gerlach (Republican-Pennsylvania) a
similar bill was proposed in the House of Representatives in 2014 without
a ban on golf courses, but it also was not enacted.47
Finally,

in

2015

Congress

passed

legislation

modifying

Conservation Easement Deductions without a ban or limitation on golf
courses under Section 170(h).48 Some scholars argue that since 2006,
Congress has effectively ignored the Conservation Easement Deduction’s
main sources of abuse as reflected in ongoing litigation between the
Service and taxpayers, and Congress has done nothing except codify
“enhanced incentives” to benefit taxpayers taking the Conservation
Easement Deduction, even when their valid conservation purpose is not
apparent.49 Analysis of the Treasury’s proposals, as follows in Sections
III, IV, V, and VI of this article explain how the Treasury proposes
rectifying these abuses.

47

Conservation Easement Incentive Act, H.R. 2807, 113th Cong. (2014).
Land Trust Alliance, Federal Law Affecting Donations of Conservation Easements, 1,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrustalliance.org/StatuteConservationEasementDonations.p
df.
49
2016 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31, at 189. “Court cases over the last decade have
highlighted donors who have taken large deductions for overvalued easements and for
easements that allow donors to retain significant rights or that do not further important
conservation purposes.” Id.
48
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IV. NEW REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON “QUALIFIED
ORGANIZATIONS” FRUSTRATE THE POLICY GOALS OF SECTION
170(H)
A.

Current Regulatory Scheme

The current regulations set forth that to become a “qualified
organization” for Conservation Easement Deduction purposes, a recipient
donee organization must: (1) be one of four qualifying organizations, (2)
demonstrate commitment to protect the donated land’s expressed
conservation purposes, and (3) “have the resources to enforce the
restrictions.”50 Each requirement is outlined further below.
First, the regulations require that a “qualified organization” is: a
governmental unit under Section 170(b)(1)(A)(v)51, an organization under
Section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi)52, a 501(c)(3) charitable organization that meets
the section 509(a)(2) public support test,53 or requirements of section
50

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009).
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(v) (2015) defines this governmental unit in reference to §
170(c)(1). That subsection defines such governmental units as “[a] State, a possession of
the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the United
States or the District of Columbia. . .” § 170(c)(1) (2015).
52
§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) defines this governmental unit in reference to § 170(c)(2) that
“normally receives a substantial part of its support (exclusive of income received in the
exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational or other
purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption under section 501(a)) from a
governmental unit referred to in subsection (c)(1) or from direct or indirect contributions
from the general public.” Id.
53
§ 509(a)(2) defines such an organization that “(A) normally receives more than one51
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509(a)(3)54 and “is controlled by an organization described within that
subsection.”55 Second, to satisfy the “commitment to the conservation
purposes” requirement, a conservation group organized or operated
primarily or substantially for one of the conservation purposes specified in
section 170(h)(4)(A) is required.56 Third, the requirement that the donee
organization have the resources to enforce the easement does not require
that the organization “set aside funds to enforce the restrictions.”57 These

third of its support in each taxable year from any combination of: (i) gifts, grants,
contributions, or membership fees, and (ii) gross receipts from admissions, sales of
merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in an activity which is
not an unrelated trade or business (within the meaning of section 513), not including such
receipts from any person, or from any bureau or similar agency of a governmental unit
(as described in section 170(c)(1)), in any taxable year to the extent such receipts exceed
the greater of $5,000 or 1[%] of the organization's support in such taxable year, from
persons other than disqualified persons (as defined in section 4946) with respect to the
organization, from governmental units described in section 170(c)(1), or from
organizations described in section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than in clauses (vii) and (viii)),
and (B) normally receives not more than one-third of its support in each taxable year
from the sum of-- (i) gross investment income (as defined in subsection (e)) and (ii) the
excess (if any) of the amount of the unrelated business taxable income (as defined in
section 512) over the amount of the tax imposed by section 511.” Id.
54
§ 509(a)(3) defines such an organization as one that is “(A) is organized, and at all
times thereafter is operated, exclusively for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, or
to carry out the purposes of one or more specified organizations described in paragraph
(1) or (2), (B) is-- (i) operated, supervised, or controlled by one or more organizations
described in paragraph (1) or (2), (ii) supervised or controlled in connection with one or
more such organizations, or (iii) operated in connection with one or more such
organizations, and (C) is not controlled directly or indirectly by one or more disqualified
persons (as defined in section 4946) other than foundation managers and other than one
or more organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2).” Id.
55
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009).
56
Id.
57
Id.
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are the only substantial current requirements placed on recipient donee
organizations.
B.

The Treasury’s Proposal Significantly Increases the
Amount of Requirements and Liability a “Qualified
Organization” Takes on as a Conservation Easement
Deduction Donee

The Treasury proposal suggests that additional regulations should
be promulgated to increase the requirements placed on “qualified
organizations” that receive a Conservation Easement Deduction qualifying
property easement.58 The proposal outlines five new requirements.
First, the new “qualified organization” regulations recommend
prohibiting a “qualified organization” from being “related to a donor or to
any person that is or has been related to the donor for at least ten years.”59
Second, the proposal mentions the regulations be amended to require all
“qualified organizations” to have “sufficient assets and expertise to be
reasonably able to enforce the terms of all easements it holds.”60 Third, the
proposal suggests that it become mandatory that all “qualified
organizations” have “an approved policy for selecting, reviewing, and

58

2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 213-17.
Id. at 215.
60
Id.
59
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approving conservations [sic] easements that fulfill a conservation
purpose.”61 Fourth, the proposal would subject any organization that
knows or should have known that it accepted an overvalued easement or
an easement that does not “further an appropriate conservation purpose” to
penalties.62
Last, to increase transparency between the Service and taxpayers,
the proposal outlines requiring Conservation Easement Deduction donees
to increase the amount of information they report about the property’s fair
market values.63 The Treasury would do this by amending Section 6033
“to require electronic reporting and public disclosure by donee
organizations regarding deductible contributions of easements that is
sufficient for transparency and accountability.”64 The Treasury proposal
suggests five specific pieces of information that must be electronically and
publicly reported by donee organizations.65

61

Id.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 215-16.
65
Id. at 216. The information the proposal suggests donee organizations release
electronically and publicly include: (1) detailed descriptions of the subject property and
restrictions imposed on the property, (2) the conservation purposes served by the
easement, (3) any rights retained by the donor or related persons, (4) the fair market value
of both the easement and the full fee interest in the property at the time of the
62
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C.

Analysis of Proposal

The analysis of the five new requirements are considered
individually and then in the aggregate. The proposal’s suggestion banning
Conservation Easement Deduction from eligibility organizations that have
a family relation to a conservation easement donor stems from a concern
that landowners are granting conservation easements that are merely
fictitious because the landowner is free to use the land without significant
impediment by an easement holder. The Treasury had not included this
recommendation in its annual revenue proposals until the 2016 Fiscal
Year.66 Despite its rationale, this new suggestion is unprecedented within
the charitable contributions of Section 170 because no such restriction has
been codified or regulation promulgated. As a result, it is unlikely the
Treasury will ever promulgate such a regulation.
Next, the Treasury’s suggestion that “qualified organizations” have
sufficient assets and expertise to attempt to curb Conservation Easement
Deduction abuse is merely a rewording of the current regulation’s “have

contribution; and (5) a description of any easement modifications or actions taken to
enforce the easement that were taken during the taxable year. Id.
66
2016 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31.
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the resources to enforce the restrictions” requirement.67 The new language
then should not be re-promulgated because it is surplusage.68 However, the
proposal sets out new requirements for a donee organization by requiring
“qualified organizations” to have “expertise to be reasonably able to
enforce the terms of all easements it holds.”69 The current requirement,
that a “qualified organization” merely “demonstrate commitment to
protect the donated land’s expressed conservation purposes” is a less
difficult standard for “qualified organizations” to meet for two reasons.
First, “demonstrating commitment” on its face requires a lower
standard of behavior on the donee organization’s behalf in relation to a
conservation compared to “expertise to be reasonably able to enforce the
terms” because the current regulation’s “demonstrating commitment”
standard merely requires that the “qualified organization” be a
conservation group organized or operated primarily or substantially for

67

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009).
While it may appear that a shift in register from “resources” to “assets” that a
“qualified organization” indicates the Treasury is more precisely requiring that a
“qualified organization” have finances available to enforce the terms of a conservation
easement it controls, current regulations already indicate that the Treasury interprets the
current “resources” requirement to mean financial resources. See id. (stating that current
regulations do not require that the organization “set aside funds to enforce the
restrictions.”).
69
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224.
68
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one of the conservation purposes specified in Section 170(h)(4)(A).70
These purposes are the same ones required by a donor of a conservation
easement. In contrast, it is unclear to what standard an organization
claiming a primary or substantial conservation purpose will need to rise to
become an “expert” under the Treasury’s proposal. This could render
ineligible current “qualified organizations” from being able to receive
Conservation Easment Deduction contributions in the future.
Second, the new proposals consider a “qualified organization” and
its capability to enforce, in the aggregate, all of the conservation
easements it accepts. Unless carefully drafted, the proposal’s new
requirement suggesting that “qualified organizations” be conservation
experts able to enforce the terms of an easement will lead to greater
uncertainty for donors and donees because both groups will be unsure
70

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2009); see also I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (2015):
“(A) In general.--For purposes of this subsection, the term
‘conservation purpose’ means-- (i) the preservation of land areas for
outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general public, (ii) the
protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or
similar ecosystem, (iii) the preservation of open space (including
farmland and forest land) where such preservation is-- (I) for the scenic
enjoyment of the general public, or (II) pursuant to a clearly delineated
Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and will
yield a significant public benefit, or (iv) the preservation of an
historically important land area or a certified historic structure.”
Id.
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whether the donee will sufficiently qualify as an expert according to the
Treasury.
The third suggestion from the proposal makes mandatory that all
“qualified organizations” use a pre-approved plan for evaluating its
decision to accept conservation easements. Scholars have opined that these
organizations, which over the past thirty years have consisted primarily of
land

trust

associations,

should

set

standardized

accreditation

requirements71 to ensure the accuracy of the valuation of conservation
easements and that the conservation easements are granted for worthwhile
conservation efforts. The goals suggested by tax scholars are consistent
with the Treasury’s goals of improving tax administration by removing
oversight of conservation value from the Service.72 The obvious benefits
of the proposal’s new requirements are that, if properly drafted, these
regulations should encourage “qualified organizations” to ensure that they
select conservation easements that are properly valued and are for valid
conservation purposes under Section 170(h) and its regulations.
Regulations exhaustively outlining how a “qualified organization” should

71
72

McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 9.
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.
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choose conservation easements also should promote transparency in the
determination process of the value and conservation purpose for a
conservation easement which currently is, from the Treasury’s
perspective, a relatively opaque process.73
The fourth suggestion the proposal lays out is a penalty for any
organization that knows or should have known that a conservation
easement that it accepted was improperly valued or does not serve a
qualifying conservation purpose. This penalty is unprecedented not only
within Section 170’s charitable deductions, but in the entire Tax Code.
The only analogy available is one from the Bankruptcy Code that imposes
similar penalties.74
The fifth suggestion the proposal makes in reference to “qualified
organizations” is that they be required to make certain public and
electronic disclosures about every conservation easement they accept.
73

Currently, the Treasury has no way of knowing whether or not a conservation easement
has been properly valued for Section 170(h) purposes until a taxpayer is audited by the
Service. A taxpayer making a conservation easement selects an appraiser who has
discretion to value the conservation according to the valuation methods outlined by
Section 170(h) and its regulations. Id. at 224.
74
See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1)(B) (2015) (stating that “If a tax return preparer— (B) knew (or
reasonably should have known) of the position, such tax return preparer shall pay a
penalty with respect to each such return or claim in an amount equal to the greater of
$1,000 or 50[%] of the income derived (or to be derived) by the tax return preparer with
respect to the return or claim.).
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There is no current public reporting requirement for donee organizations
upon receipt of a conservation easement under Section 170(h) which will
likely add to the transaction costs associated with Section 170(h)
conservation easement contributions.
Combined, the five additional requirements that the proposal
places on “qualified organizations” are intended to ensure the accuracy of
donor valuations of conservation easements and that such easements are
only granted to land that furthers important governmental conservation
goals that produce significant public benefit. The Treasury views these
“qualified organizations” as almost quasi-governmental regulatory
authorities who can validate the accuracy of a donor’s intent in
contributing a conservation easement. Placing this new set of
responsibilities on “qualified organizations” should increase transparency
between taxpayers and the Treasury.
However, the five new proposals substantially increase the
regulatory requirements placed on “qualified organizations” and subject
them to penalties in an unprecedented fashion. Currently, “qualified
organizations” who receive conservation easements generally pay nothing
for them; most donees, usually land trusts associations that receive
342
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conservation easements require that donor’s pay all transaction costs
related to the conservation easement contribution.75 This amount can be
substantial under the current regulatory scheme, amounting at times up to
$10,000 or more a donor must pay to donate an easement of his or her
land.76 Therefore, in the aggregate, the increased regulatory burden placed
on organizations who may receive these easements likely will increase the
transaction costs associated with accepting responsibility for a Section
170(h) conservation easement and decrease the number of organizations
who hold themselves out as “qualified organizations.”
Increasing the transaction costs of a Section 170(h) contribution
will likely deter landowners from donating conservation easements.
Surveys of Conservation Easement Deduction donor intent indicate that
increased transaction costs dissuade landowners from making such

75

McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 26, n. 93; see also William T. Hutton, The Munificent
Conservation Easement, 9 CALIFORNIA LICENSED FORRESTERS ASS’N. (2002),
http://www.clfa.org/documents/Archives/The-Munificent-Conservation-Easement.pdf
(noting that the donation of an easement is nearly always conditioned upon a
simultaneous cash gift sufficient to cover the generally predictable costs of the land trust's
monitoring responsibilities and the contingent and unpredictable costs of future
enforcement proceedings).
76
McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 26; see also Lynn Asinof, Your Money Matters:
Conservation Easements Lighten Taxes, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL C15 (Aug. 9, 1999)
(noting that the easement donation process “typically takes many months, can cost $5,000
to $10,000 or more, and may require creation of an endowment for the parcel”).
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contributions.77 Additionally, decreasing the number of potential donees
likely means that those organizations that remain “qualified organizations”
must either ensure they have to increase their financial resources to
enforce the increased number of easements they accept, or they will have
to reject conservation easement contributions. If the number of “qualified
organizations” decreases, and those that do qualify take on their maximum
number of easements possible in accordance with their amount of required
substantial assets, landowners will not be able to find “qualified
organizations” to which they can donate their land. As a result,
landowners will not be able to take a Conservation Easement Deduction
for their land and will likely not place an easement on their land, leaving
land open to future development. If “qualified organizations” become
saturated, landowners would effectively become unable to take the
deduction, which would frustrate Section 170(h)’s broad policy goal of
preserving the amount of undeveloped land in the United States.78

77

McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 43-47 (analyzing three key national surveys of
conservation easement donor intent that concludes that reasons for such donations
included “strong personal attachment to and concern about the long-term stewardship of
their land” and “for tax incentives”).
78
S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9-10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6744-45
“The committee believes that the preservation of our country's natural resources and
cultural heritage is important, and the committee recognizes that conservation easements
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Empirical studies strongly indicate that in the recent history of Section
170(h), a significant amount of undeveloped land has been donated that
would not have been otherwise.79
Indeed,

adding

additional

requirements

to

“qualified

organizations” will likely decrease the number of conservation easements
made because it runs counter to the well-established correlation between
federal tax incentives and their positive effect on the number of
conservation easements contributed.80 Congress and the Treasury have
desired to use federal tax incentives to produce more conservation
easements since the 1980s.81
Other sources have also indicated the importance of the
Conservation Easement Deduction’s incentives to encourage landowners
to place conservation easements on their lands. Notably, in a 2013 letter

now play an important role in preservation efforts. The committee also recognizes that it
is not in the country's best interest to restrict or prohibit the development of all land areas
and existing structures. Therefore, the committee believes that provisions allowing
deductions for conservation easements should be directed at the preservation of unique or
otherwise significant land areas or structures. Accordingly, the committee has agreed to
extend the expiring provisions of present law on a permanent basis and modify those
provisions in several respects.” Id. at 9.
79
Id. See also David Marone, Conservation Easements: Protection in Perpetuity (Oct. 3,
2016, 4:39 PM), THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://www.wsj.com/articles/donaldtrumps-tax-numbers-tighten-focus-on-treatment-of-losses-1475415294.
80
McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 21.
81
Id. at 50.
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from the Western Governors’ Association to the Senate Finance
Committee, in response to the pending “Rural Heritage Conservation
Extension Act of 2013” and its House of Representatives’ counterpart the
“America Gives More Act,” the Western Governors’ Association affirmed
its belief that “providing economic incentives for landowners to
voluntarily participate in conservation efforts is likely to achieve more
efficient and cost-effective [conservation] results.”82 Multiple surveys
done nationwide have also indicated that donors contribute Conservation
Easement Deductions not purely for conservation purposes but
predominantly for significant federal income tax savings.83
To avoid discouraging landowners from making conservation
easement

contributions

and

limiting

the

number

of

“qualified

organizations,” the Treasury could ban the applicability of Section 170(h)
for golf courses for the reasons set forth in Section V of this article. If the
Treasury still maintained that limitations were necessary for all Section
170(h) contributions, it should temper their current proposals in two ways.
82

Letter from Brian Sandoval, Governor, State of Nev., and John Kitzhaber, Governor,
State of Or., to the Senate Fin. Comm., WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://www.westgov.org/letters-testimony/344-wildlife/802-letter-support-forconservation-easements-legislation.
83
McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 43-47.
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First, the Treasury should abandon penalties on “qualified
organizations” who “should have known” that upon audit by the Service
reveal that the conservation easement was overvalued or did not
adequately further a conservation purpose. This standard exists nowhere
else in the Tax Code. Taxpayers and “qualified organizations” will be
unsure for a significant period of time what conduct establishes that a
“qualified organization” should have known that a conservation easement
was overvalued or for improper conservation purposes until private letter
rulings, revenue procedures, revenue rulings, regulations, and tax court
cases are filed to test this new requirement. Additionally, such a penalty
should be abandoned because “qualified organizations” do not receive any
direct monetary benefit by receiving a conservation easement; imposing a
financial penalty on a “qualified organization” targets the wrong group.
Any penalty should be imposed on conservation easement donors.
However, it does seem reasonable that knowingly accepting an improperly
valued conservation easement should be penalized because this standard is
a common creature of the Code and easier for the Service to establish in an
audit contesting the validity of a conservation easement. But overall, the
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Treasury

should

not

adopt

a

“should have known” penalty on “qualified organizations.”
Second, the Treasury should temper its current proposals by not
requiring that “qualified organizations” have the expertise to enforce all
conservation easement restrictions without explaining in detail through
regulations how that raises the current standard of behavior and action for
“qualified organizations.” Otherwise, current “qualified organizations”
will likely lose eligibility and no longer be able to accept conservation
easements. Overall, the Treasury should be weary of the effects the five
new requirements the proposal suggest will have on “qualified
organizations,” their potential frustrating effect on the Conservation
Easement Deduction’s legislative purpose, and on the amount of
conservation easements donated.
V. THE PROPOSAL INCREASES SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS ON
DONORS WITHOUT SETTING CLEAR GUIDELINES
A.

Current Regulatory Scheme

“Conservation purpose” means one of four things under current
regulations:
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(i)

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

The preservation of land areas for outdoor recreation
by, or the education of, the general public, within the
meaning of paragraph (d)(2) of this section,
The protection of a relatively natural habitat of fish,
wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem, within the
meaning of paragraph (d)(3) of this section,
The preservation of certain open space (including
farmland and forest land) within the meaning of
paragraph (d)(4) of this section, or
The preservation of a historically important land area or
a certified historic structure, within the meaning of
paragraph (d)(5) of this section.84

Currently, the preservation of open space in Section 1.170A14(d)(4)(1) requires that it must be done to achieve a “clearly delineated
federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy” and create
significant public benefit,85 or be for public “scenic enjoyment” that
creates substantial public benefit.86 The proposal, then, would expand the
current requirement for conservation easements of all types, not just those
that preserve open spaces. This section of the regulation also outlines in
great detail how a donor must demonstrate that the contributed land serves
a “clearly delineated [governmental] conservation policy” 87 and

84

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (2009).
§ 1.170A-14(d)(4).
86
Id.
87
Id.
85
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determining whether the conservation easement produces a satisfactory
public benefit.88 To establish that a conservation policy is met by a
conservation easement, the regulations provide that conservation
easements must “further a specific, identified conservation project” and
lists several examples of what types of purposes are plainly satisfactory.89
To yield significant public benefit, the conservation easement must
satisfy a facts and circumstances inquiry that determines whether the
property satisfies certain unweighted factors.90 The regulations currently
provide 11 such factors that the Service will take into account upon
auditing a taxpayer claiming a Conservation Easement Deduction. 91 The

88

Id.
Id. “This requirement will be met by donations that further a specific, identified
conservation project, such as the preservation of land within a state or local landmark
district that is locally recognized as being significant to that district; the preservation of a
wild or scenic river, the preservation of farmland pursuant to a state program for flood
prevention and control; or the protection of the scenic, ecological, or historic character of
land that is contiguous to, or an integral part of, the surroundings of existing recreation or
conservation sites. For example, the donation of a perpetual conservation restriction to a
qualified organization pursuant to a formal resolution or certification by a local
governmental agency established under state law specifically identifying the subject
property as worthy of protection for conservation purposes will meet the requirement of
this paragraph.” Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
“(1) The uniqueness of the property to the area;
(2) The intensity of land development in the vicinity of the property
(both existing development and foreseeable trends of development);
(3) The consistency of the proposed open space use with public
programs (whether Federal, state or local) for conservation in the
89
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proposal does not indicate that the Treasury will promulgate additional
regulations to more concretely determine whether a conservation easement
creates the necessary amount of public benefit to qualify for the
Conservation Easement Deduction.
It is noteworthy that “clearly delineated conservation purpose” and
“significant public benefit yield” are statutory requirements that are
unprecedented.92 These dual requirements have no companions in any
place in the Tax Code. They did not come in existence until the Tax
region, including programs for outdoor recreation, irrigation or water
supply protection, water quality maintenance or enhancement, flood
prevention and control, erosion control, shoreline protection, and
protection of land areas included in, or related to, a government
approved master plan or land management area;
(4) The consistency of the proposed open space use with existing
private conservation programs in the area, as evidenced by other land,
protected by easement or fee ownership by organizations referred to in
§ 1.170A–14(c)(1), in close proximity to the property;
(5) The likelihood that development of the property would lead to or
contribute to degradation of the scenic, natural, or historic character of
the area;
(6) The opportunity for the general public to use the property or to
appreciate its scenic values;
(7) The importance of the property in preserving a local or regional
landscape or resource that attracts tourism or commerce to the area;
(8) The likelihood that the donee will acquire equally desirable and
valuable substitute property or property rights;
(9) The cost to the donee of enforcing the terms of the conservation
restriction;
(10) The population density in the area of the property; and
(11) The consistency of the proposed open space use with a
legislatively mandated program identifying particular parcels of land
for future protection.” Id.
92
See Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, 94 Stat. 3521 (1980).
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Treatment Extension Act of 1980 and have only been given elaboration
based on a Senate Finance Committee report.93
B.

The Treasury’s Proposals

The proposal describes modifying the current definition of
“conservation purposes” by requiring “all contributed easements further a
clearly delineated Federal conservation policy (or an authorized State or
tribal government policy) and yield significant benefit.”94 Additionally,
the proposal would increase the amount of “conservation purpose”
substantiation required by a donor, by requiring him or her to give
exhaustive summaries of the conservation purpose served by the easement
and the public benefits it will yield.95 An organization and its managers
would incur a penalty if they warrant certain “values that they know (or
should know) are substantially overstated.”96 This is a departure from the
current regulatory scheme that only requires such conservation purpose
substantiation for the preservation of open spaces. As described below in §
IV(C) of this Article, the Treasury will likely apply the “conservation
93

McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 14-15.
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.
95
Id. at 215. Additionally, a donor must substantiate and warrant that the fair market
value of the easement is accurate. Id.
96
Id.
94
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purposes” and “public benefit” regulations for preservation of open spaces
purposes to all conservation easements irrespective of a conservation
easement’s conservation purpose.
C.

Analysis of Proposal

Given that a current subsection of Section 170(h) already contains
exhaustive regulations outlining what

constitutes an appropriate

governmental conservation purpose and requisite public benefit, it is likely
that the Treasury will base any new regulations on these current ones for
their expanded application to all types of land eligible for the
Conservation Easement Deduction. Application of the current regulations
will have three significant implications for Conservation Easement
Deduction donors.
First, the proposal’s requirement that a conservation easement
“further a specific, identified conservation project”97 likely will create
uncertainty for taxpayers unless, like the current regulations, more
examples

are

included

illustrating what

conservation

easements

accomplish such purposes. Second, the current “facts and circumstances”
inquiry based on 11 un-weighted factors to determine whether a
97

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1) (2009).
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conservation easement’s conservation purpose yields significant benefit
will similarly create significant taxpayer uncertainty. Unless a more
formulaic method for determining substantial public benefit is
promulgated, taxpayer uncertainty seems inevitable for all Conservation
Easement Deduction donors. Lastly, given the new substantiation
requirements placed on donors for valuation and conservation purposes,
this will likely increase transaction costs associated with the conservation
easement contribution. Given that an increase in transaction costs
decreases the amount of conservation easements donated, these provisions
frustrate the Conservation Easement Deduction’s purpose.98 Taxpayers
will expend more in receiving expert determinations whether their
conservation easements yield enough public benefit for a qualifying

98

S. REP. NO. 96-1007, at 9-10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 674445:
“The committee believes that the preservation of our country's natural
resources and cultural heritage is important, and the committee
recognizes that conservation easements now play an important role in
preservation efforts. The committee also recognizes that it is not in the
country's best interest to restrict or prohibit the development of all land
areas and existing structures. Therefore, the committee believes that
provisions allowing deductions for conservation easements should be
directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise significant land
areas or structures. Accordingly, the committee has agreed to extend
the expiring provisions of present law on a permanent basis and modify
those provisions in several respects.”
Id.
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conservation purpose. Another potential transaction cost may be a
taxpayer seeking a private letter ruling from the Service to determine
whether his or her conservation easement is for a valid conservation
purpose that yield significant public benefit. Receiving such a ruling is
expensive,99 but given the average amount donors receive in the
deduction, taxpayers likely will want to guarantee their conservation
easement meets these requirements.100
It seems likely, then, that as transaction costs increase, the number
of future donors will decrease because the value of the Conservation
Easement Deduction will be less significant. A decrease in the number of
Section 170(h) donors, however, may not be wholly disadvantageous from
a policy standpoint. Increased substantiation should deter landowners from
making Section 170(h) donations who do so for land that lacks such
significant

conservation

merit.

From

this

perspective,

increased

substantiation for all Conservation Easement Deduction donors will deter
fraudulent or less meritorious uses of the Conservation Easement
Deduction. However, if the Service and the Treasury are predominantly
99

Rev. Proc. 2016-1 I.R.B. App’x A. Private letter rulings costs range between $250 and
$50,000. Id.
100
Joint Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 24.
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concerned with landowners claiming conservation easements for land used
as a golf course, then an outright ban, as Section V of this Article explains,
would be a more efficient way to reduce taxpayer fraud without increasing
transaction

costs

that

deter

meritorious

conservation

easements

contributions.
VI. THE PROPOSAL’S EXCLUSION OF GOLF COURSES IS CONSISTENT
WITH SECTION 170(H)’S LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
There are currently no regulations that specifically address golf
courses for Conservation Easement Deduction purposes. In contrast, the
proposal seeks banning “any contribution of a partial interest in property
that is, or is intended to be, used as a golf course.”101 The Treasury’s
proposal is consistent with its position as expressed in the Treasury’s
revenue proposals for fiscal years 2013, 2014, and 2016.102 It is

101

2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 216.
2014 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2016
Treasury Proposal, supra note 31. All three proposals state verbatim “The proposal would
amend the charitable contribution deduction provision to prohibit a deduction for any
contribution of property that is, or is intended to be, used as a golf course.” The
Treasury’s revenue proposal for fiscal year 2015 leaves out a proposal recommending
that golf courses no longer qualify under Section 170(h), but instead focuses on
increasing the amount of deductions farmers and ranchers can deduct for issuing a
conservation easement over their lands. 2015 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31, at 195.
Therefore, despite the omission of golf courses from the Treasury’s revenue proposals in
2015, it is reasonable to infer that the Treasury has consistently maintained that golf
courses should no longer qualify under Section 170(h) since its revenue proposal for
fiscal year 2013. Id.
102
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noteworthy that it was in 2013 that the Service lost Kiva Dunes and began
auditing more taxpayers who made Conservation Easement Deductions for
golf courses.103
The Treasury’s proposal to prohibit land used or intended for use
as a golf course from Section 170(h) qualifications is reasonable because
golf courses and their coinciding use are not consistent under regulatory
definition for “recreation purposes.” Indeed, the Treasury explained that
golf courses, especially those that are located in high-income private
housing, present a unique class of conservation easements the Service has
difficulty effectively auditing.104 The Treasury explains that significant
Conservation Easement Deductions taken for preserving “recreational
amenities, including golf courses, surrounded by upscale private home
sites . . . may accrue to a limited number of users such as members of the
course club or the owners of the surrounding homes, not the general
public.”105 In contrast, Section 170(h)’s regulations list no example of
Section 170(h) qualifying property that is similar to a golf course.
Examples of farmland preserved for flood prevention, natural land
103

Dezember, supra note 13.
2013 Treasury Proposal, supra note 31; 2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.
105
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224.
104
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formations to be enjoyed by the public, and woodlands along public
highways are clearly what the Treasury intended the Section 170(h)
deduction be taken for.106 Section 170(h)’s examples also describe
undeveloped lands, especially in highly developed and populated
metropolitan areas.107 All of the examples Section 170(h)’s regulations
contemplate do not include land used as a golf course. The exclusion of
golf courses from Section 170(h) seems reasonable given that it has no
regulatory example that supports their inclusion.
Additionally, golf course construction and management may
contradict conservation purposes. The Treasury notes in its proposal that
golf courses “may even result in environmental degradation.”108 This idea
does not seem so farfetched with reports of the chemicals used on golf
courses and the relatively insignificant size of ecological habitats that can
be reasonably claimed to be preserved by the golf course management.109
A recent case illustrates this. In Atkinson v. Commissioner, the tax
court held that a golf course’s use of pesticides and other chemical

106

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv)(B) (2009).
Id.
108
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224.
109
Rubin, supra note 15.
107
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treatments damaged the land’s ecosystem which is inapposite with
Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(e)(2) 110 that states “the preservation of
… [land] would not [satisfy the conservation purpose test] if under the
terms of the contribution a significant naturally occurring ecosystem could
be injured or destroyed by the use of pesticides.”111 As a result, the
taxpayer was denied $7.88 million deduction.112 The Atkinson case
illustrates how golf courses do not generally conform to the “recreational
purposes” the Treasury and Congress anticipated would be eligible for the
Conservation Easement Deduction.113
Moreover, by definition, granting a conservation easement
prohibits the donor from developing the property to protect the easement’s
conservation purpose. While that conservation purpose may vary, any
donor action that compromises that conservation purpose should cause the
donor to forfeit his or her Conservation Easement Deduction because he or
she resumes enjoying unrestricted use of the property. This is a problem

110

Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(2) (2009).
See generally Atkinson v. C.I.R., 110 T.C.M. 1 (CCH) 550 (T.C. 2015).
112
Id. at 2.
113
However, it is important to note that the 2013 act did not pass with the golf course
ban, as drafted by the Treasury, but eventually passed in 2015 without such a prohibition.
This could mean that Congress does not agree that a categorical ban on golf courses is
consistent with Section 170(h)’s history. Land Trust Alliance, supra note 48.
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that has arisen with golf courses specifically, unlike other conservation
easements. Reports of donors claiming paved pathways, tees, fairways,
and the entire greens represent the most controversial conservation
easements claimed.114
The three above reasons demonstrate how golf courses vary
considerably from the types of land and conservation purposes intended by
Section 170(h) and its regulations. These reasons support the Treasury’s
suggestion that golf courses should be denied Section 170(h) eligibility.
The Treasury should promulgate regulations to make such a ban because
doing so is the most efficient way to deal with the majority of taxpayer
Section 170(h) abuse. It is the most efficient regulatory approach for three
reasons.
First, a ban would eliminate all future litigation against taxpayers
claiming Conservation Easement Deductions for golf courses. Golf course
conservation easement audits and tax court cases have been the most
contentious and difficult for the Service to determine if a conservation
easement in question was properly valued and for valid conservation

114

Rubin, supra note 15.
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purposes.115 Banning golf courses from Conservation Easement Deduction
eligibility would prevent the Service from having to continue its current
crackdown on golf courses in litigation as it has done for the past ten
years.116 Therefore, a golf course ban from Conservation Easement
Deduction eligibility would reduce the amount of time the Service spends
auditing and litigating golf course lawsuits and allows “qualified
organizations” and donors to make conservation easement contributions
with only its current statutory and regulatory obligations.
Second, a Section 170(h) ban of golf courses allows meritorious
conservation easement contributions to occur between donors and
“qualified organizations” under only the current statutory and regulatory
requirements. Sections III and IV of this Article discussed the increased
obligations and liabilities that “qualified organizations” and conservation
easement donors would take on if those regulations were promulgated and
the decrease in conservation easements made they would likely cause. To
avoid these adverse effects, the Treasury should merely ban golf courses
from Section 170(h) eligibility.

115
116

Id.
Id.; McLaughlin, supra note 22.
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Third, a categorical ban on golf courses from Section 170(h)
eligibility provides the most efficient regulatory scheme the Treasury
could pursue to achieve its policy goals of promoting greater taxpayer
certainty, reducing taxpayer abuse, and furthering valid conservation
purposes.117
Denying golf courses from Section 170(h) eligibility will mean
that worthwhile conservation efforts will be frustrated because a
significant number of golf courses promote valid conservation efforts;118
however, given that golf course use runs primarily counter to the valid
conservation efforts for which its owner claims a conservation easement,
if the Treasury is prepared to ban golf courses outright from Section
170(h) eligibility, the Treasury should not also increase requirements on
non-golf course Conservation Easement Deduction donors. As Sections III
and IV of this article demonstrate, promulgating regulations to add
requirements on “qualified organizations” and conservation easement
donors will likely discourage donors from making such donations because

117
118

2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.
See Glass v. C.I.R., 124 T.C. 258 (2005), aff'd, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006).
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of high transaction costs119 and decrease the number of “qualified
organizations”120 who can accept Section 170(h) conservation easements.
Overall, a ban on golf courses is the most efficient way for the Service to
avoid costly litigation and to promote the donation of conservation
easements.
VII. THE SUGGESTED TAX CREDIT PROGRAM OFFERS TAXPAYER
CHOICE IN TAX INCENTIVES FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENT
CONTRIBUTIONS
The Treasury proposed creating a non-refundable tax credit for
conservation easement contributions.121 The Treasury would create a
federal interagency board that distributed the amount of conservation
easement contribution tax credits permitted by the Treasury annually to
“qualified charitable organizations and governmental entities that hold and
enforce conservation easements.”122 In its first year, the Treasury would
permit $100 million and would increase that amount to $475 million
annually and adjusted for inflation, if the pilot program is successful.123
Conservation easement donors could receive up to a 50% of the fair
119

McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 42-47.
See generally § III(C).
121
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19.
122
Id.
123
Id.
120

363
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss1/12

44

Pratt: Will Regulations Prevent Litigation?

market value of their easement in credits that could be used to offset their
income tax liability.124 Any residual credit could be carried forward 15
years.125 The proposal also requests that a Congressional report be made
by the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior on the
merits of the conservation easement credit to compare it to Section
170(h)’s deduction.126
On its face, the aggregate amount the Treasury proposes to set
aside for the Tax Credit seems small compared to the $1.1 billion claimed
in deductions by 1,112 taxpayers in 2012 claiming Section 170(h)
deductions. However, this disparity is conflated because the $1.1 billion
figure reflects the amount of income that goes untaxed and not the total
amount of tax liability of individual taxpayers forgone.
Unlike a tax deduction that reduces a taxpayer’s taxable income, a
tax credit offsets dollar-for-dollar a taxpayer’s income tax liability.127 This

124

Id.
Id.
126
Id.
127
Key Elements of U.S. Tax System (2016) TAX POLICY CENTER,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/whats-difference-between-tax-deductionsand-tax-credits. “Deductions reduce taxable income and their value thus depends on the
taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, which rises with income. Credits reduce taxes directly and
do not depend on tax rates. However, the value of credits may depend on the taxpayer’s
basic tax liability. Nonrefundable credits can reduce tax to zero but any credit beyond
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means that, if the tax deduction were structured as a tax credit, the current
amount claimed would equate to $363 million.128 Given that scholars have
determined that the Service has forgone $112 million because of
fraudulent or overvalued Section 170(h),129 this makes the real amount of
current deduction translated into tax credit less fraud about $250 million.
If the pilot tax credit is electable, the Treasury’s pilot tax credit amount of
$100 million seems patently reasonable. Indeed, the significant increase in
the amount of credit to be available in the aggregate indicates that the
Treasury may wish to phase out the Conservation Easement Deduction.
While beyond the scope of the proposals, a movement towards a tax credit
for Section 170(h) would benefit “land rich income poor” landowners who
grant conservation easements because those landowners have less taxable
income,

on

average,

than

landowners

with

higher

incomes.130

Additionally, vesting in decentralized organizations the power to grant tax
credits may be an effective way of ensuring the Treasury’s Section 170(h)
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policy goals of transparency and accuracy of conservation easement
valuation and conservation purpose substantiation.
For individual taxpayers, this proposed conservation easement tax
credit is good for donors who do not generate enough taxable income over
the 15-year carry forward period for the current deduction. 131 In contrast,
a tax credit offsets a taxpayer’s tax liability and can be carried forward to
offset tax liability for 15 years. Overall, if the Treasury wishes to give
“land rich income poor” landowners greater tax incentive to make
conservation easements, then it should pilot the tax credit.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This article examined the United States Treasury Department’s
current proposals for amending Section 170(h) of the Internal Revenue
Code in light of ongoing litigation that the Internal Revenue Service is
pursuing against taxpayers who are claiming substantial amounts of
deductions for the conservation easements they contribute.132 Until now,
litigation has been the only way that the Internal Revenue Service has
been able to test the validity of a taxpayer’s Conservation Easement
131

Gattuso, supra note 128.
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19; see also I.R.C. § 170(h) (2015), Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14 (2009).
132
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Deduction,133 this Article suggests that the most efficient regulatory
approach the Treasury could take to curb taxpayer abuse of Section 170(h)
is to categorically ban golf courses from deduction eligibility. Doing so, as
opposed to adding additional obligations and potential penalties to
“qualified organizations”134 – most of which pay nothing to receive the
conservation easement – and to donors that are foregoing land they could
profitably develop, would prevent “qualified organizations” from losing
their qualified status, and prevent donors from being discouraged to make
conservation easement contributions. By banning golf courses from
Section 170(h) eligibility, the Service will likely not have to audit and
litigate against taxpayers because the majority of future fraudulent Section
170(h) claims will be prevented from making any deduction at all.
An outright ban of golf courses also avoids the need for the Service
to modify the “conservation purpose” requirement under Section 170(h)135
that would increase transaction costs on potential conservation easement
donors. To further Section 170(h)’s legislative purpose to decrease the
development of land in the United States, the Treasury could consider
133

Rubin, supra note 15.
2017 Treasury Proposal, supra note 19, at 224.
135
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134
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implementing a tax credit in lieu of the Conservation Easement Deduction
to encourage conservation easement donations by “land rich, income
poor” landowners.136 In any scenario, a Section 170(h) ban on golf courses
creates the most efficient regulatory scheme for preventing taxpayer abuse
and avoiding costly litigation.

136

Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 130, at 10229.
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